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Background: Contributory social health insurance for formal sector employees only has proven challenging for moving
towards universal health coverage (UHC). This is because the informally employed and the poor usually remain excluded.
One way to expand UHC is to fully or partially subsidize health insurance contributions for excluded population groups
through government budget transfers. This paper analyses the institutional design features of such government subsidization
arrangements in Latin America and assesses their performance with respect to UHC progress. The aim is to identify UHC
conducive institutional design features of such arrangements.
Methods: A literature search provided the information to analyse institutional design features, with a focus on the following
aspects: eligibility/enrolment rules, financing and pooling arrangements, and purchasing and benefit package
design. Based on secondary data analysis, UHC progress is assessed in terms of improved population coverage,
financial protection and access to needed health care services.
Results: Such government subsidization arrangements currently exist in eight countries of Latin America (Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay). Institutional design features and UHC
related performance vary significantly. Notably, countries with a universalist approach or indirect targeting have higher
population coverage rates. Separate pools for the subsidized maintain inequitable access. The relatively large scopes of
the benefit packages had a positive impact on financial protection and access to care.
Discussion and Conclusion: In the long term, merging different schemes into one integrated health financing system
without opt-out options for the better-off is desirable, while equally expanding eligibility to cover those so far excluded.
In the short and medium term, the harmonization of benefit packages could be a priority. UHC progress also depends on
substantial supply side investments to ensure the availability of quality services, particularly in rural areas. Future research
should generate more evidence on the implementation process and impact of subsidization arrangements on
UHC progress.
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Latin America has a long social health insurance (SHI)
tradition. This had resulted in segmented systems, in
which a SHI scheme covers almost exclusively formal
sector employees only, and private health insurances
those who can afford it. The “rest” of the population, i.e.
those in the informal sector, have thereby usually
resorted to government health services provided by the
Ministry of Health (MOH), resulting in segmented
service delivery structures as well [1]. Progressing
towards UHC has proven to be difficult in many of the
countries with a SHI system, particularly as to the inclu-
sion of population groups outside the formal sector [1–4].
Various vulnerable population groups cannot afford to pay
contributions on their own, because they have no income,
a very low income, or a very unsteady income.
In fact, there is an emerging consensus among countries
on the need to reform health financing systems in order
to accelerate progress towards Universal Health Coverage
(UHC). UHC means that everyone can access quality
health services without facing financial hardship as a re-
sult [5]. The 2014 Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO) strategy for universal access to health and UHC
acknowledges that there are many different ways to
progress towards UHC and that each country will need to
establish its own action plan, taking into account its social,
economic, political, legal, historical and cultural context as
well as its priorities and current and future health chal-
lenges [6]. The health financing reform steps taken by
countries in Latin America during the last decades toward
these objectives reflect this diversity [7].
While not the only UHC extension approach, a trend
can be seen in Latin America however, in that several
countries have moved towards UHC and expanded cover-
age to people outside the formal sector by transforming
the SHI logic that is based on entitlement against
mandatory contributions for formal sector employees.
These countries have done so by subsidizing health insur-
ance type arrangements through state budget transfers,
which serves to cover non-contributing individuals out-
side the formal sector. This allows to delink entitlements
from contributions [8]. Here, a health insurance type
scheme is understood as a health financing scheme that
usually starts from an insurance logic: it provides coverage
of an explicit benefit package to defined and entitled indi-
viduals that are identified and affiliated, in exchange for
explicit or implicit contributions paid by or on behalf of
these. Notably, this type of health financing mechanism
and expansion strategy towards UHC is found in countries
with strongly varying economic and fiscal situations.
The existing body of literature provides country
focused health system reform studies. Specifically, the
Lancet 2014 paper series on UHC in Latin America in-
cludes a cross-country overview of health systemsreforms aiming at UHC in Latin America [9, 10]. Build-
ing upon these, this paper fills a gap in the literature: it
gives an overview of such arrangements for Latin
America and specifically analyses institutional design
features of subsidization of health insurance type
schemes and their potential contribution to progress
towards UHC, with the aim of deriving policy lessons of
what works and what does not. The institutional design
of a financing arrangement is understood as policy, legal
or regulatory specifications that define this arrange-
ment’s structure and the way it operates. Furthermore,
this paper is part of a series of regional studies on
Europe (Vilcu/Mathauer 2016 for Eastern-European
high-income countries [11] and Mathauer et al. [14] on
low- and middle-income countries of the European
WHO Region [12]), Asia 2016 (Vilcu et al. [13]) and Af-
rica (Mathauer et al. [14]).
The next section presents the methodology and analyt-
ical framework applied. The Results section assesses the
institutional design features of the schemes as well as
progress towards UHC. The Discussion explores
possible effects of key institutional design features on
UHC and related challenges, followed by a Conclusion.
Methods
This study chose to consider those Latin American
countries with Romance languages, thus excluding the
Dutch or English speaking countries and Caribbean
island states, most of which with relatively small popula-
tions, because they have a different history. In a first step,
all countries in this language group were considered if the
Global Health Expenditure Database reported social
health insurance (SHI) expenditure (or termed social
security expenditure for health in WHO’s Global Health
Expenditure Database). The second step consisted in iden-
tifying countries with a health insurance type arrangement
that covers people outside the formal sector by using state
budget transfers. Thirdly, countries without SHI expend-
iture were screened to see whether there is a country with
a government subsidization arrangement, but without SHI
expenditure. This last step did not expand the list of
countries included in this study. Altogether, these study
inclusion criteria rendered eight countries to be assessed
here, namely Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. As
such, countries with a budget funded population-wide
national health care system such as Brazil or Cuba, or
countries with social health insurance for formal
sector employees, but without subsidized enrolment
for people outside formal sector work, like El
Salvador were excluded.
The study is based on a comprehensive literature
search from 1990 to December 2015. Data bases and
search engines used in English included Scopus, Science
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CLASE for Spanish material. In Google, the first five
pages, with 10 results per page, were considered, exclud-
ing commercial pages and ads, news press or other
irrelevant pages. The search terms used for collecting in-
formation on institutional design features included:
health system OR budget transfer OR health
subsidization OR health subsidy OR health insurance
OR health vulnerable AND country name AND/OR
scheme name. The data search for information on pro-
gress towards UHC was based on the following terms:
impact health insurance OR catastrophic health expend-
iture OR impoverish* health care OR out-of-pocket pay-
ment OR financial protection OR access health OR
utilization health care OR health insurance coverage OR
universal coverage OR impact OR effects AND country
AND/OR scheme name. Additionally, data for the pro-
gress assessment was collected from the WHO’s Global
Health Expenditure Database [15], government and
country insurance fund webpages. Thus, the study is
based on a literature review and analysis of secondary
databases. This search strategy generated 70 sources for
country information from peer-reviewed journals,
studies and reports from United Nations organisations
(primarily World Bank, ILO and WHO) and research
institutes as well as from reports and legal provisions
published by governmental organisations. Most of the
studies found were country health financing analyses to
review reform experiences, but no studies with explicit
impact evaluation design were found.
For each country, respective titles identified through
the search process were reviewed, and if found to be
relevant the abstract or executive summary was read. If
this suggested that the publication could provide infor-
mation on the institutional design or UHC related indi-
cators, the full publication was assessed. Since the
search generated several publications for each country,
this allowed for cross-check and triangulation to gather
valid and reliable (largely descriptive) information on
both institutional design aspects as well as UHC related
progress data. Officially published data (e.g. from
government) and data found in peer-reviewed journals
were used as the preferred source when incoherences
were found across several studies. Where in doubt about
data, the respective information was checked with WHO
country experts. The analytical framework outlined
further below guided the information extraction
process from the literature, as well as data compil-
ation and organisation.
To identify plausible contributions and patterns of
institutional design features in relation to UHC progress,
we plotted the improvements in UHC related progress
indicators against the respective institutional design
features for the eight countries using the analyticalframework explained below. Multiple country sources
helped to capture changes over time. Where data points
of different years were available, progress towards UHC
over time and in relation to changes in institutional
design could be assessed, however, it was often difficult
to do so due to scarce data availability for most of the
indicators. This is a limitation to this study, and in view
of the multiple factors affecting progress towards UHC,
this analysis is of explorative nature.
The paper’s analytical framework to assess the
institutional design features of budget transfer arrange-
ments starts from the three health financing functions
described in Kutzin [16] and looks specifically at the
following features:
Revenue raising





– Benefit package design and type of providers
covered
– Cost-sharing arrangements
– Provider payment methods and purchasing
arrangements
The detailed analytical framework, which was devel-
oped for these regional studies [11–14] is found in
Table 1, which specifies the institutional design aspects
and outlines how these potentially relate to progress to-
ward UHC. Progress towards UHC refers to improve-
ments in population coverage (here specifically focusing
on reported enrolment rates), in financial protection and
in access to care. The design features and progress indi-
cators are defined and explained in more detail in the
next section, but just to emphasise here that checking
whether the poor and lower income quintiles benefit at
least proportionally is important for equitable progress
towards UHC. It is also important to note that subsi-
dized enrolment and coverage in such schemes is only
one possible and plausible factor among several to ex-
plain improvements in population coverage, the level of
financial protection and access to care of subsidized
beneficiaries. The overall economic and fiscal situation is
thereby decisive in expanding fiscal space that can be
used for state budget transfers to subsidize health insur-
ance contributions. The following Results section and ta-
bles present the most recent information available.
Results
Country and Scheme Overview
Since the start of the millennium, economic growth,
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gion have created windows of opportunity for health
financing reforms [9, 17]. Eight countries have now
subsidization arrangements. The Dominican Republic,
Peru, Mexico, Bolivia and Uruguay have introduced a
subsidization arrangement by providing state budget
transfers to health insurance type schemes in the
2000s. In contrast, the subsidization arrangements of
Chile, Costa Rica and Colombia had already long
been in place by then, since 1973, 1979, and 1993 re-
spectively (see Table 2, Column 2). In the case of
Chile, a broader and explicit benefit package, called
AUGE (“Universal Access to Explicit Guarantees”)
came in place in 2003, expanding service coverage
and improving coverage equity. These insurance type
arrangements were set up with a purchaser-provider
split in all countries other than Bolivia, Mexico and
Uruguay. All countries studied belonged to the group
of upper middle-income countries at the time of the
implementation of the subsidization schemes, with
the exception of Bolivia, which is a lower-middle in-
come country. Chile and Uruguay are high income
countries since 2012 as per the World Bank classifica-
tion [18].
Definition of eligible groups
Eligibility rules reflect a country’s understanding of
which population groups are considered ‘vulnerable’
with regard to health care access. Hence, how eligibility
is defined will affect the proportion of the population
ultimately subsidized, and who will remain uncovered.
In the eight studied Latin American countries, a wide
range of different vulnerability and eligibility criteria is
found to determine who benefits from subsidization via
health insurance type schemes (see Table 3, column 2).
Poverty and low income are the most frequent criteria.
Except for Bolivia and Uruguay, countries classify the
population into (income) segments as a basis to deter-
mine eligibility for benefiting from subsidized coverage.
The poorest are in all countries entitled to full
subsidization, with the exception of Bolivia where the
poor are not specifically defined as an eligible group. In
addition, all countries have defined certain vulnerable
population groups to be eligible for subsidization based
on socio-demographic or socio-economic characteristics.
The most frequently covered groups comprise older
persons (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic,
Uruguay), persons with disability (Bolivia, Chile, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Uruguay), (rural) self-employed
workers (Costa Rica, Peru, Mexico, Colombia), and the
unemployed (Dominican Republic, Peru, Uruguay) (see also
Table 3). Due to their political situation and historical past,
some countries have applied more context-specific eli-
gibility criteria such as internally displaced personsand demobilized combatants (Colombia) or victims of
state terrorism and human rights violations (Uruguay
and Chile) (see Table 3, Column 2). In Peru, eligibility
has recently been granted to all households located in
specifically defined and particular poor and disad-
vantaged areas.
Targeting and enrolment of eligible persons
In order to identify individuals and households eligible for
subsidization all countries use some form of targeting (see
Table 3). Most countries studied use both direct and indir-
ect targeting in a complementary way to identify eligible
individuals. Direct targeting through (proxy) means test-
ing by determining household income and/or assets are
applied in six countries. Households are identified on the
basis of surveys (in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru) or via
household visits (Costa Rica and Dominican Republic).
Three countries (Colombia, the Dominican Republic,
Peru) use social assistance identification systems that were
originally set up for other social programmes to target in-
dividuals for subsidized health insurance. Indirect target-
ing is applied to include persons on the basis of socio-
demographic (e.g., age, sex), socio-economic (occupation,
employment status) or socio-geographic characteristics.
These characteristics are easily observable and identifiable
as well as correlated with vulnerability [19]. Another form
of indirect targeting is to include beneficiaries of social as-
sistance programs, namely beneficiaries of a conditional
cash transfer program (Mexico), family allowances (Chile
and Colombia), pension assistance schemes (Chile,
Colombia and Dominican Republic), or social programs
for demobilized combatants and internally displaced per-
sons (Colombia).
Since 2010, Mexico has effectively extended eligibility
in principle to all those outside the formal sector, aban-
doning its former direct targeting approach [20, 21]. In
Colombia, the central government had equally decided
to shift to such a universalist approach, covering all out-
side the formal sector, however, resource constraints
somewhat undermined these intentions [21].
Enrolment is mandatory in all countries except for
Mexico and Uruguay. As to the actual enrolment
process, both directly and indirectly targeted beneficiar-
ies need to take active steps to get enrolled in all ob-
served countries, except in Bolivia. Getting active
implies that the potential beneficiaries need to be well
informed about their entitlement to subsidization. In
most countries, enrolment takes place at local or re-
gional offices of the government organizations that are
in charge of identifying eligible persons (Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Peru,
Uruguay), or else at provider level, as in Chile and
Mexico. To better reach eligible persons and make en-
rolment possible when attending health care services,
Table 2 Country and Scheme Overview
Country Name of subsidization scheme
















Funds as % of
GGHE 2012) [51]
Bolivia “Mother and Child Universal
Insurance” (Seguro Universal
Materno Infantil, SUMI)
(2002), in existence already since
1996 as the Seguro Nacional de
Maternidad y Niñez, SNMN;
“Health Insurance for older persons”
(Seguro de Salud del Adulto Mayor,
SSPAM) (2006) These two insurance
type schemes were merged in
December 2013 into a new program
“the Integrated Health Service of
the Plurinational State” (Servicio
Integral de Salud del Estado
Plurinacional), that also covers people
with disabilities [28]
33.2 57 63 (2002) 72 37
Chile “National Health Fund” (Fondo
Nacional de la Salud, FONASA) (1979)
2003: Plan de Acceso Universal de
Garantías Explícitas (AUGE) [28] –
this meant that an explicit
guaranteed benefit package
came into being.
Subsidization of vulnerable groups also through:
- Explicit Primary Health Care
Interventions Program
- Law of catastrophic insurance
n/a 48 38 (2004) 49 9
Colombia “Subsidized Scheme” (Régimen
Subsidiado) (1993: “Mandatory
Health Plan” (Plan Obligatorio
de Salud)
43.3 55 - 75 83
Costa Rica “Costa Rican Social Security Caisse”
(Caja Costarricense de Seguridad
Social, CCSS)
(1973: Ley n.° 5349, de Traspaso
de Hospitales)




Subsidiado) (2001: Ley General
de Salud)
33.2 22 34 (2001) 67 47
Mexico Seguro Popular de Salud
(2004: Reglamento de la Ley
General de Salud en Materia
Protección Social en Salud)
n/a 42 44 (2004) 52 56
Peru “Integrated Health Insurance”
(Seguro Integral de Salud)
(2009: Ley Marco de
Aseguramiento Universal
en Salud)
33.6 54 57 (2001) 61 35
Uruguay “National Integrated Health
System” (Sistema Nacional
Integrado de Salud)
(2007: Law No. 18,211)
21.1 31 56 (2007) 71 60
THE Total health expenditure, GGHE, General government health expenditure
Mathauer and Behrendt BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:145 Page 6 of 25Costa Rica and Peru have established these offices
within the local health care facilities. In various cases
public media campaigns serve to raise overall aware-
ness for the respective subsidization schemes within
the population [22].Financing sources
Since the introduction of the subsidization scheme, the
general government expenditure on health (GGHE) as a
percentage of total health expenditure (THE) has risen
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points in Peru to 20% points and 33% points in
Colombia (compared to 1995) and the Dominican
Republic respectively (see Table 2). The scale of state
budget subsidies is not insignificant, as revenue data
from other regions suggest [11–14], but precise data is
not available for these Latin American countries. None-
theless, GGHE as a share of THE is still below 60% in
two countries (Chile and Mexico).
General government revenues are the main source
for financing the subsidization schemes, with the ex-
ception of Colombia and Costa Rica (see Table 4,
Column 2). Notably, in four countries (Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica), some sources of revenues are
ear-marked for state budget transfers, these are pre-
dominantly “sin” taxes on tobacco, alcohol or gam-
bling. Chile, on the other hand, earmarks its
increased VAT, while Bolivia has an earmarked tax on
hydrocarbons. Moreover, in Mexico, Peru, or Bolivia
and Colombia, budget transfers come from state, re-
gional or municipal revenues respectively. Notably,
only in Peru is the subsidization scheme partly fi-
nanced by donors, with 6% of its funds coming from
donors and regional revenues [23]. Colombia is
unique in using cross-subsidies as an important
source of revenue for the subsidy scheme: 1.5% of
total collections from the contributory regime are
transferred to the subsidized scheme [24].
Level of subsidization
In all schemes, all population groups eligible for
subsidization are fully subsidized and do not have to
co-contribute, with a few exceptions only. These are
largely poor people and the medically vulnerable. The
exception applies to low-income informal sector and
independent workers in Costa Rica, Peru and Mexico,
who are only partially subsidized and who have to co-
contribute (see Table 4, Column 5). The contribution
rates for self-employed workers in Costa Rica’s semi-
contributory regime range from 3.75 to 11.00% of
income depending on the earnings. In Mexico, co-
contributions for those households above the 5th income
decile (outside the formal sector) are supposed to rise
with the income, but this rule has not been imple-
mented: Only 1% of the enrolled households had
contributed to Seguro Popular in the past, until it moved
to a universalist approach. In Peru, the semi-contributory
regime applies to about 5% of households, with contribu-
tions amounting to about two thirds of the average
expenditure per insured.
Calculation logic of the subsidy
Countries use different approaches to determine the
state budget transfer amount for the subsidized (seeTable 4, Column 3). The first approach is to define an
overall budget as a lump sum transfer, which is negoti-
ated annually and expanded depending on available
funding. This approach is used in Chile, Costa Rica and
Peru. A second way is to transfer a fixed share of the
budget, which in the case of Bolivia is transferred from
the national level to the municipalities, where it is
pooled with the municipal health budget.
In a third group of countries, the subsidy transfer is
based on a per capita amount, which is an estimate of
what is needed to purchase the respective benefit pack-
age (individual-based calculation logic). This is in place
in the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Uruguay. For
the latter two, this per capita amount is risk adjusted.
Finally, Mexico uses a mixed approach by combining the
individual-based calculation logic for the fixed allocation
per enrolled individual (“social contribution”) and a risk-
adjusted federal “solidarity contribution”. On average,
the federal solidarity contribution amounts to 150% of
the “social contribution” and depends on the number of
enrolled individuals, health needs and the performance
of health facilities.
Pooling architecture
The way resources are pooled determines how the costs
of illness are shared across the population. Pooling of re-
sources and health risks is found to take place in two
ways: The subsidized are either covered by a separate
scheme, or they are integrated and part of a national
scheme (see Table 5). The latter option is found in three
countries (Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay), where a sin-
gle health insurance fund at the national level includes
and covers both the subsidized and the contributors,
allowing for cross-subsidization. In Costa Rica, 50% of
revenues from contributions serve to finance coverage of
the non-contributory groups [10]. In Chile, however, this
potential for cross-subsidization is reduced to some ex-
tent, since usually younger, healthier and high income
people decide to opt out from the public health insur-
ance scheme and choose among a number of competing
private insurers (Instituciones de Salud Previsional -
ISAPREs). In contrast, the other five countries (Bolivia,
Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico, Colombia) have
established multiple pools, with a separate scheme for
the subsidized and other schemes for formal sector
employees. However, cross-subsidization from contribu-
tory scheme to the subsidized scheme exists in Colombia,
where 1.5% of funds collected from payroll taxes (12.5% of
salaries) are transferred to the subsidized scheme. Notably,
Colombia is the only country with a full-fledged model of
managed competition applying to both the contributors’
and subsidized scheme. The insured can choose from
competing insurers/purchasing agencies (Health Promo-
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for the Subsidized Regime [25]. This multiple pool system
is combined with risk-adjusted per capita allocation mech-
anism for the purpose of risk equalization across different
schemes. Moreover, some countries have set up special
funds for “catastrophic” diseases, i.e. illness events that
may lead to very high, catastrophic expenditure. Finally, in
several countries, fragmentation is further deepened
through the existence of separate schemes for various
public servant groups, such as the Armed Forces and the
National Police [26].
Beyond fragmented, separate schemes, fragmentation
also occurs along territorial lines. In Mexico, in Chile,
and in Colombia and Bolivia, actual fund flows and
pooling occurs at the state, regional and municipal level
respectively. However, in Colombia, with the highest
number of sub-pools (about 1,000), as well as in Mexico,
central government funds are allocated on the basis of
risk adjustment criteria to the sub-national pools.
Mexico uses a federal solidarity contribution with the
aim to adjust socio-economic inequalities across states
with poorer states receiving more funding. In Colombia,
prospective risk adjusted allocations for the sub-pools at
the municipal level are based on age, sex and geographic
area.
Last not least, the level of risk pooling is also deter-
mined by the type of membership. Mandatory affiliation
is known to result in a more balanced risk composition
and hence stronger redistributive capacity in contrast to
voluntary affiliation. It is found that the subsidized are
affiliated on a mandatory basis in all countries except for
Mexico and Uruguay. However, in the Dominican
Republic mandatory affiliation is actually not fully imple-
mented. Moreover, as affiliation of formal sector
employees is also mandatory in all countries, this further
strengthens risk pooling in those countries with an inte-
grated scheme. Yet, as Chile allows opting out to private
health insurance schemes, this results in fragmentation
and population groups with higher risks are concen-
trated in FONASA [27].
Benefit package design: Scope of services and type of
providers covered
Purchasing is defined as the allocation of pooled funds
to the health care service providers on behalf of the
population for a defined benefit package. The definition
of the range of services covered in the benefit package is
decisive for the level of financial protection and access
to care, as are the cost-sharing mechanisms. In general,
over the recent decade, a real expansion of the benefits
covered is notable [9, 28]. Uruguay, which has intro-
duced an “Integrated Health Care Plan” without specific-
ally defining its contents, and Costa Rica have broad
benefit packages, although rationing occurs throughwaiting lists for example. The other six countries have
chosen to specify the explicitly guaranteed health ser-
vices covered for all insured or for specific insured
groups, e.g. through a health care plan or a list that de-
fines by law which health conditions or clinical proce-
dures are covered or not covered. The scope of these
lists, however, varies (Table 6, Column 2). For Chile,
Mexico and Colombia (since 2012), this is a relatively
comprehensive package, covering in-patient, out-patient
and specialized care as well as drugs. Compared thereto,
the Dominican Republic and Peru have less comprehen-
sive benefit packages for the subsidized, particularly in
terms of in-patient care, specialized or high cost ser-
vices. Moreover, four countries cover selected high-cost
treatments through a separate catastrophic illnesses fund
(Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay). Over re-
cent years, increases in available funding (in Chile,
Mexico), but also, among other reasons, judicial trials (in
Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay) have gradually expanded
the range of benefit packages towards more specialized
care interventions [29].
The covered benefit package for the subsidized is
largely purchased from and delivered through govern-
ment providers. However, in order to secure that
services of the benefit package are actually provided,
these can also be obtained from private providers in
Colombia [21], Peru [30] and Chile [31]. Nonetheless,
access to health services is unequal in that respect, since
contributors have a more direct access to private pro-
viders, in particularly in the countries with separate
schemes [28]. Last but not least, most countries have
introduced portability of coverage within the whole
country, such that beneficiaries have access to services
beyond the area where they are registered.
Cost-sharing mechanisms and rates
In all the countries studied emergency care and some spe-
cific key (primary) health care services offered by public
facilities of MOH can be accessed by everyone, regardless
of insurance status, but co-payments are required [20, 21,
32, 33]. In contrast, for the covered benefit package the
fully subsidized are completely exempt from any form of
co-payments in all countries except in Colombia (Table 6,
Column 3). In Colombia, the subsidized in the 3rd and 4th
income groups (out of four categories and thus not
belonging to the poorest), have to make co-payments of
10% up to a ceiling of a monthly’ minimum wage.
Provider payment methods and purchasing arrangements
Separate purchasing agencies are in place in all countries
other than Mexico, Bolivia and Uruguay. But even when
there is a separate purchasing agency, the separation of
functions remains incomplete in countries where the
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national budgets, such as in Chile. Beyond institutional
design, there are also capacity challenges. For example,
the Dominican Republic [32] and Peru [34] are reported
to have experienced some problems to effectively
contract providers. Potential advantages of a purchaser-
provider split can thus not be pursued in its full poten-
tial, such as a move towards more strategic purchasing.
Related thereto, the types of provider payment
methods in place have implications on provider behav-
iour and hence on access to care. As Table 6 shows,
countries use a diversity of combinations of paying for
both outpatient and inpatient care and there are efforts
to move towards more strategic purchasing by using
provider payment methods that set incentives for more
efficient provider behaviour. For example, case payment
is used in two and capitation is used in four countries
respectively. Fee-for-service, nonetheless, remains very
dominant. Most importantly, all countries studied use
the same provider payment methods for the subsidized
and those in the formal sector schemes, with the excep-
tion of Mexico. However, average per capita spending
for the subsidized is found to be lower than for the
contributors in a number of countries [32, 35].
Progress on universal health coverage indicators
Population coverage
In view of the focus on subsidized health insurance type
schemes here, population coverage is understood as the
percentage of the population that is enrolled to a health
insurance scheme. Total population coverage thereby in-
dicates the comprehensiveness of the health insurance
system in a country. It is important to note, though, that
reported enrolment rates cannot be equated with effective
access to health services. On the one hand, enrolment
may not mean that people are already (or again) in posses-
sion of a (renewed) insurance card. Moreover, non-
availability of services and other supply side constraints
such as staff shortages and quality concerns limit access.
As Table 7 shows, total enrollment rates are above
95% in Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, and even higher in
Costa Rica and Mexico. It is somewhat lower in Peru
(72% in 2012) and the Dominican Republic (69% in
2016). Some of the countries studied have made sub-
stantial progress in enrolment rates within relatively
short time. In Mexico in the early 2000s almost half of
the population was without any type of insurance cover-
age. Since 2003, more than 41% of the population got
insured under the Seguro Popular [36]. In Peru, enrol-
ment has increased from 37% in 2004 to 72% in 2012
[33, 34]. The Dominican Republic has almost tripled the
number of insured people within nine years; from 27%
in 2007 to 55% in 2013 and 69% in 2016 (see Table 7,
Column 2). Costa Rica and Colombia started muchearlier on this road with impressive results as well. Chile
and Uruguay have increased their already high insurance
coverage rates from 89% in 2007 to 94% in 2012 and
from 86% in 2007 to 95% in 2013 respectively. Hence
over the last decade, all countries have made consider-
able progress in enhancing enrolment rates.
Looking specifically at the share of the subsidized as of
total insured or total population gives an idea of the
magnitude of the subsidization arrangement. In fact,
there are large differences across countries (see Table 7,
Columns 3 and 4). In Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay,
with coverage rates above 90%, the share of the fully
subsidized among the total insured population is only
20%, 11% and 5% respectively, since most of the popula-
tion are contributors. This share is between 40-45% in
Mexico, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, yet also
due to overall lower insurance coverage rates in the lat-
ter two countries. Colombia, with a high total insurance
coverage rate, has the largest share of subsidized people
within their insured populations (58%). In Peru, on the
other hand, the share of the subsidized among the in-
sured is equally large (54%), but the total enrolment rate
is still lower at 72%. The magnitude of the subsidization
scheme is a function of the size of the formal sector, but
also of the political commitment to define eligibility for
subsidization more broadly.
Moreover, it is important to reveal whether and how
effectively the subsidization schemes reach the target
beneficiaries. Table 7 (Columns 5 and 6) also presents
data related to targeting effectiveness: The inclusion
error refers to the share of non-eligible individuals being
enrolled in the subsidization scheme. The exclusion
error refers to individuals that are in principle eligible
but that are not enrolled. The high exclusion errors in
Peru and in particular in the Dominican Republic are
noteworthy and of concern. This may relate to the
primarily direct targeting approach applied in those two
countries. However, the exclusion error also needs to be
seen in relation to the size of the eligible population. For
example, in Costa Rica with 12% being eligible for
subsidization, the 10% exclusion error affects 1% of the
total population.
With respect to the inclusion error, on the other
hand, more recent data is only available for Colombia
and Peru, however, wrong inclusion is also reported
for other countries. The share of non-eligible persons
among those being subsidized had been high in
Mexico and ranged from 54% to 60% in the years
after the introduction of the Seguro Popular [37, 38].
One reason related to the way Seguro Popular is
financed. There is no incentive for the State Government
Authorities for Social Protection in Health to assess
household income to determine household contribu-
tions to be collected upon enrolment. Instead, federal
Table 7 Insurance Enrolment Rates
Country Insurance Enrolment Rates of
Total Population (in %)
Share of subsidized within
total population (in %)
Share of subsidized within total
insured population (in %)
Exclusion error Inclusion error





20% (2012) [95] 19% (2012) [95] n/a n/a
Colombia 89% (2008) [79];
96% (2010) [21]
53% (2014) [79] 58% (2014) [79] 2% (2013) [21] 16% (2013) [21]
Costa Rica 87% (2003);
98% (2014) [27]
11% (2014) 11% (2010) [75]
10.6% (2014)
10% (2010) [46] n/a
Dominican Republic 40% (2009) [32];
55% (2013) [96],
69% (2016) [97]
25% (2013) [96] 46.% (2013) [96] 68% (2009) [32] n/a
Mexico 57% (2003);
98% (2012) [36]
44% (2012) [36] 44% (2012) 10% (2009) [22] n/a
Peru 64% (2010);
72% (2012) [33]
39% (2012) [33] 54% (2012) [33] 16% (2013) [30] 12% (2003)
Uruguay 86% (2007);
95% (2013) [77]
5% (2013) [77] 5% (2013) n/a n/a
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enrolled individuals and assessing income and collect-
ing contributions from them would reduce their will-
ingness to enrol [20]. As a result, a high enrolment
rate was achieved at the expense of a high inclusion
error that implied large amounts of public funds
going to households not in need for it [37].
Financial protection
Global evidence has shown that there is a strong correl-
ation between out-of-pocket expenditure (OOP) as a
share of total health expenditure (THE) and the share of
households experiencing financial hardship [39]. Thus, a
starting point is to look at trends in OOP as a share of
THE. Financial protection, specifically, can be measured
in two complementary ways. One is to measure the inci-
dence of catastrophic expenditure. This occurs when a
household’s total OOP equal or exceed 40% of the
household’s non-subsistence spending, i.e. their capacity
to pay, as per the WHO definition [40]. Different (lower)
thresholds of determining catastrophic expenditure have
also been proposed in the literature and are being used
(and reported here). The second measure is impoverish-
ing health expenditure that occurs when OOP pushes a
household below the poverty line or even deeper into
poverty [39].
Across the Latin American countries studied here,
three countries (Peru, Chile, Mexico) have a relatively
higher share of OOP expenditure (between 29% and
44% in 2014) compared to the other five countries,
where OOP expenditure as of THE ranges between 15%
and 25% in 2014. However, other than in Costa Rica andUruguay with slight increases, OOP has been decreasing
[15]. Data in Table 8 (Column 3) also confirms that
countries with a higher OOP share tend to have a rela-
tively higher incidence of catastrophic health expenditure.
In fact, the lowest incidence of catastrophic health ex-
penditure (at a 40% threshold level) is found in Costa Rica
(0.4%), whereas it is considerably higher in Chile (6.4%)
and in the Dominican Republic (9.8%, however at a 30%
threshold), despite the latter’s moderate OOP level of 21%.
Moreover, disaggregated data reveals that a high percentage
of households from the lowest two income quintiles faces
catastrophic health expenditure at a 25% threshold in Chile
and Colombia (15 and 10% respectively), while this percent-
age is the lowest in Costa Rica (1%).
Access to health care services
Enrolment rates and financial protection indicators do
not reveal whether people actually have effective access
to needed health services, i.e. the ability to receive health
services they need implying the availability, affordability
and acceptability of services, or whether they forego
seeking care [41]. This is difficult to measure directly, as
need cannot be easily captured for all health services.
Utilization rates for inpatient and outpatient care are
therefore used as proxy indicators. Comparing utilization
rates before and after the introduction of the subsidization
scheme and between the insured and uninsured over time,
or if that data is not available, across income quintiles,
may thereby reveal improvements or prevailing inequities
in access to care.
Data on health service utilization rates before and after
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remained lower than the ones of contributors, access to
health care services has improved for the poorest in-
come quintiles in all these countries (see Table 8, Col-
umn 5). This increase has been very high in Colombia,
where in comparison to the remaining uninsured, a 50%
increase in the use of health services among the subsi-
dized urban poor and the rural population could be ob-
served over the period of 1995 to 2005.
Discussion
Effects of eligibility criteria and targeting approach on
population coverage
This section explores the plausible contribution of insti-
tutional design features relating to eligibility and
enrolment rules on UHC progress and also highlights
particular challenges. The way eligibility for subsidization
is defined together with the specific targeting method
seem to be decisive for insurance coverage rates of the
subsidized groups.
Eligibility criteria and what is considered as vulnerable
vary somewhat across the countries, although most
countries pursue several definition logics to capture the
most vulnerable population groups, which partly overlap.
All countries except Bolivia originally put a strong focus
on the poor, identifying them on the basis of assessing
their means and income. Another focus is on socio-
demographically defined groups (children, older persons,
pregnant women or mothers). A third eligibility logic is
to include social security or social assistance recipients,
e.g., the unemployed, disabled and family allowance
beneficiaries, such as in Uruguay, Mexico, Dominican
Republic and Chile.
However, there remain critical coverage gaps of some
specific economically or medically vulnerable population
groups. It is found that illegal immigrants and people
without documents are not explicitly mentioned as being
eligible for subsidization in all countries studied, and
hence they remain excluded [42] as are indigenous people
(in Peru for example) [43] and internally displaced persons
[44] in some countries and areas. Another group are the
officially unemployed [45]. Also, many of Peru’s uninsured
are not poor but low-income and would be eligible for the
semi-contributive regime. Still, enrolment of these persons
is difficult to implement and as in other countries across
the globe, partial subsidization has not considerably
increased population coverage. Limited resources also
determine the definition of eligibility criteria. For example,
in Bolivia, due to resource constraints, eligibility had been
restricted to pregnant women, children and older persons,
until coverage was slightly expanded to include people
with disabilities in 2013 under the new scheme.
As to the effect of different targeting approaches,
evidence suggests that indirect targeting may be moreprone to inclusion errors. Also, it appears that direct
targeting is one contributing factor for higher exclusion
errors, as exampled by Peru and the Dominican Republic
(with a primarily direct targeting approach) as well as
Mexico in earlier years. But the exclusion error can also
be due to cumbersome enrolment procedures, as found in
Costa Rica with a 10% exclusion error relating to 12% of
the population being eligible for subsidization [46]. The
near to universalist approach that Mexico applies since
2010 in practice results in close to 100% population
coverage rates. Yet, this is realized at the cost of an inclu-
sion error of people that should be covered by the formal
sector insurance schemes.
Due to limited evidence, it remains unclear to what
extent the design feature of mandatory membership
enhances enrolment rates and whether active enrolment
by the authorities to facilitate enrolment is decisive even
under mandatory affiliation. Moreover, the chosen tar-
geting approach does not always coincide with fiscal
reality and resource availability. This was the case in
Colombia for example, where some municipalities were
not able to mobilize sufficient resources for their per
capita budget transfer to subsidize the enrolment of all
eligible people outside the formal sector [21, 26]. How-
ever, generally speaking, if municipal funding is required
to enrol eligible individuals, the incentive to enrol may
not be as strong. In Colombia, as a result, certain vulner-
able groups were prioritized over others [24]. In recent
years, however, this challenge has been overcome. Like-
wise, in the Dominican Republic and Peru, resource con-
straints and slow implementation of their targeting
approaches (also applied in other social assistance/pro-
tection programmes) equally explain the high exclusion
error thus preventing the actual population coverage po-
tential as per their eligibility rules [30, 32].
Effects of the pooling architecture on equity in access
Some variation is found among countries with respect to
critical pooling design aspects, namely scheme integra-
tion versus scheme separation as well as mandatory
versus voluntary membership. This determines the size
and composition of the risk pool and thus the level of
fragmentation as well as the scope for cross-subsidization
within the system. Among the three countries with an
integrated pool, Costa Rica stands out with a high degree
of cross-subsidization from the contributors to non-
contributors. It is also notable that for the five countries
with separate schemes, benefit packages differ despite
harmonization efforts in some cases, and in fact, in these
countries, the subsidized have access to a smaller benefit
package than the contributors.
Only one of these countries (Colombia) has estab-
lished a direct cross-subsidy mechanism across different
schemes in addition to risk-adjusted per capita
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not overcome inequalities in access to services and thus
perpetuates differences in financial protection of those
in the subsidized scheme versus those in the contribu-
tory scheme. Hence, the coexistence of multiple schemes
in which different socio-economic groups are covered by
different funding pools, maintains or even increases
inequalities in access and financial protection in the
countries with separated schemes.
Mandatory coverage increases risk pooling, even in the
four countries with separate schemes. When coupled
with an integrated risk pool, solidarity in financing and
the scope for cross-subsidization is larger, such as in
Uruguay and Costa Rica. With its opting out option,
Chile (with an integrated scheme) is the only country
with substitutive private health insurance, thus limiting
overall solidary and equity in financing and access.
Moreover, ISAPREs members can switch back to
FONASA, especially above a certain age or when suffer-
ing from severe illness, when their premiums and
co-payments increase. As such, FONASA is burdened
with the high-risk members, whereas ISAPREs engages
in risks-selection to enrol low-risk members [47]. Re-
form discussions are underway on how to reform and
unify the two sub-systems of FONASA and ISAPREs.
Countries with sub-pools at sub-national levels are
particularly prone to the problem of unequal access to
health services when there are different socio-economic
conditions and disease burden across sub-national units.
Therefore, Colombia and Mexico have developed risk
adjustment mechanisms. In Mexico, this new formula of
resource allocation from the federal level has improved
the funding situation in poorer states such as Chiapas
and Oaxaca [37]. However, the impact the risk adjust-
ment mechanism actually had on the financing situation
in poorer states should not be overestimated since more
funding was available in all states after the introduction
of the Seguro Popular in 2003 [37]. The complexity and
difficulty of balancing risks across sub-pools was also
experienced in Colombia, where the indicators used did
not adequately predict the population’s health needs and
demand for health services in each area. [21] New and
more sophisticated risk adjustment techniques are being
considered [21].
Effects of benefit package design on financial protection
and access
The benefit package design including its co-payment
mechanisms and rates as well as benefit ceilings for the
subsidized affect the degree of financial protection and
utilization rates. One important commonality across
countries is that there are no co-payments for the subsi-
dized, except in Colombia. In combination with
expanded benefit packages, this could have contributedto the reduction in OOP in most countries. Likewise,
this may explain increased utilisation rates noted in all
countries with available data.
Another important feature are the specific and explicit
lists of services covered in the benefit package. Some
argue that these specific lists are potentially more effect-
ive, equitable and efficient than implicit rationing [48].
However, the comparatively larger scope of the benefit
package in Costa Rica and Uruguay can be considered to
have had an important impact on the relatively higher
levels of financial protection. For example, in Costa Rica
OOP mainly occurs when attending outpatient services
such as dentist consultations or when paying for certain
medicaments. In contrast, OOP on in-patient care is
minimal [49], and its catastrophic health expenditure is
the lowest among all the countries studied. In view of
the relatively higher OOP share in Mexico, yet its
relatively lower incidence of catastrophic expenditure,
Seguro Popular seems to be able to provide financial
protection for the subsidized. This suggests that even if
overall OOP may not decline rapidly with high coverage
because of many factors – one being that families were
under-spending on health before UHC – the risk of
catastrophic or impoverishing health expenditures is
substantially reduced. Again, the selection of services be-
ing covered including those covered by the Catastrophic
Expenses Protection Fund may explain this
phenomenon.
However, except for Colombia since 2012, the scope of
the benefit package in countries with separate schemes
is not equal to the one for those enrolled in the con-
tributory scheme and has resulted in lower capitation
payments for the subsidized [7]. For example, average
capitation payments differ quite significantly in the
Dominican Republic (four times higher for contributors
in 2010 [32]) and Peru [34]. Likewise, in Colombia in
2011, US$ 506 was spent per contributor compared to
US$ 302 per subsidized [35]. In 2012, the government
passed new regulations that aimed at all citizens having
the same benefit package regardless of their health insur-
ance coverage arrangement. Moreover, even when bene-
fit packages are harmonized and come along with
similar payment rates, effective access may still remain
unequal due to service quality problems and supply side
constraints that may persist especially in remote and
poor areas where the subsidized live [21, 32].Effects of provider payment methods and purchasing
arrangements on access
While all countries studied use the same provider pay-
ment methods for the subsidized and those in the formal
sector schemes, with the exception of Mexico, payment
rates have differed and average per capita spending for
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tributors in a number of countries. This may be due
lower utilisation rates of the subsidized, or else due to
hidden incentives for cream skimming, i.e. preferring
some patients from one population group, which in turn
can lead to the under-provision of services to financially
less attractive subsidized patients. More data is needed
to assess this further.
Likewise, evidence on purchasing arrangements is in-
sufficient to determine whether the introduction of a
purchaser-provider split as well as contracting of pro-
viders in all countries have increased service delivery,
efficiency and equity for the subsidized. Colombia is the
only country studied that manages competition among
purchasers, but this has not right away resulted in more
choices and competition among providers. Accordingly,
Frenk (2014) suggests that countries need to further
strengthen the separation of functions [17].
In sum, the lack of data on UHC progress is a limita-
tion to assessing the effect of critical institutional design
features, and there is thus need for robust and rigorous
impact studies. Future research should generate more
evidence on the implementation process as well as the
impacts of the schemes on UHC progress, differentiated
along population groups, income quintiles as well as in-
sured versus uninsured and the contributors versus the
subsidized. This is the basis to explore further options of
improving coverage and also provide lessons to other
countries across the globe that plan to introduce
subsidization schemes.
Conclusion
This paper explored the patterns of institutional design as-
pects of subsidization arrangements using state budget
transfers with a focus on population groups outside formal
sector employment and especially vulnerable population
groups. Notably, the analysis revealed numerous com-
monalities but also differences across countries. A number
of policy lessons can be derived from this analysis.
First of all, in all countries, the poor are fully subsidized
and do not have to pay partial contributions. This is analo-
gous to the design features that were revealed in all the
other regional studies with the same research question
[11–14]. The main challenge here is to ensure that the
amount of transfers is sufficient and allows for sustainability
of the health insurance type scheme in the long run. An
important institutional design feature is the choice of the
targeting method. Where a universalist approach of
covering all those outside formal sector work is not (yet)
feasible given the fiscal situation, a combination of both
direct and indirect targeting, including socio-demographic,
socio-economic and/or socio-geographic criteria, is condu-
cive to increase enrolment rates. This design pattern is also
found in Asia and Africa primarily. Equally critical is tomake affiliation mandatory, which all countries except two
did. Again this is similar to the design pattern found in the
other regions. Other important features are the specific and
explicit lists of health services covered in the benefit pack-
age and exemption of the subsidized from co-payments.
One key lesson is that this has to go along with increased
state budget revenues the amount of which needs to be
adapted to both the (increasing) number of affiliated per-
sons, particularly when participation is mandatory, and to
the average costs of the benefit package.
With regards to pooling, countries that established in-
tegrated schemes along with mandatory coverage re-
duced fragmentation and have a better chance to
improve equity in access and financial protection. Thus,
in the medium and long term, the most desirable way
for countries with separated schemes to improve equity
is to merge separate schemes into one integrated health
financing system without opt-out options for the better-
off. In the short term, the aim could be to work towards
a harmonized benefit package, at least with respect to
the range of services of covered and more equal per
capita spending. Yet, although a prerequisite for access,
it is clear that legally granted coverage and comprehen-
sive benefit packages on paper are not enough in view of
existing quality differences between rural and urban
areas and wealthy and poorer communities. There is
urgent need to have sufficient funding reaching the facil-
ity, but also to allocate resources more equally within a
country. Access to good quality health services can only
become a reality if shortages in human resources, infra-
structure and supplies are also addressed. Moreover, it is
important that people are well informed about their
entitlements, particularly in terms of their eligibility
status for subsidization and the scope of the respect-
ive benefit package.
Despite the considerable progress achieved through
the subsidization arrangements that made a difference to
thousands of people, there remain concerns as to in-
equity in access and financial protection across income
quintiles and population groups even in countries with
integrated schemes. Moreover, certain population groups
remain excluded as they are not eligible for
subsidization, in particular near- or non-poor informal
workers. There is need to expand eligibility criteria to
cover the hard to reach groups as well.
In addition to favourable institutional design, expansion
of population coverage to so far non-covered population
groups as well as extension of the health services covered
is also enhanced by economic growth that opens the
necessary fiscal space for subsidization, coupled with
political will. Countries with limited resources can expand
coverage in a progressive way.
Overall, this analysis suggests that state budget trans-
fers to health insurance type arrangements have been
Mathauer and Behrendt BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:145 Page 22 of 25one way to expand coverage of vulnerable groups and
those outside formal sector work in the studied
countries. As in Africa and Asia, this financing arrange-
ment is gaining momentum across the Latin American
region and reflects the move towards a human rights
based approach to health in which entitlements are no
longer linked to members' direct contributions.
Abbreviations
AUGE: Plan de acceso universal de garantias explicitas (Chile); FONASA: Fondo
nacional de la salud (Chile); GGHE: General government health expenditure;
ILO: International labour organization; ISAPREs: Instituciones de salud previsional
(Chile); MOH: Ministry of health; OECD: Organization for economic co-operation
development; OOP: Out-of-pocket expenditure; PAHO: Pan America health
organization; SHI: Social health insurance; THE: Total health expenditure;
UHC: Universal health coverage; WHO: World health organization
Acknowledgements
We thank Ileana Vilcu for her valuable support and research assistance, particularly
on data analysis. We express our gratitude to Ariostus Matus for his inputs to the
literature search and valuable comments, in particular on Mexico. Last not least,
we also thank and gratefully acknowledge very helpful comments from Claudia
Pescetto, Cristian Morales and Fabio Durán Valverde. The authors are responsible
for all remaining errors.
Funding
Financial support to WHO was provided by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) under the Program for Improving Countries’ Health
Financing Systems to Accelerate Progress towards Universal Health Coverage, as
well as from the EU-Luxembourg-WHO UHC Partnership program. At the time of
the research and manuscript drafting, Thorsten Behrendt was a volunteer with the
HGF Department - his fellowship was funded by the Carlo Schmid Program.
Availability of data and materials
All data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article
and references are provided. Published articles were found via Scopus,
Science Direct, PubMed and JSTOR as well as Scielo and CLASE for Spanish
publications. All other material was accessed from publicly available
webpages, as indicated in the reference section.
Authors’ contribution
IM conceived the study and its design. TB undertook the literature review. IM
and TB undertook the analysis and interpretation of data and drafted the
manuscript. All authors have read and approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
IM is a health systems development and health financing specialist in the
Department of Health Systems Governance and Financing at the World Health
Organization in Geneva. At the time of writing, TB was a volunteer within the
same department and now works as an advisor for the social health protection
network Providing for Health (P4H) at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Bonn, Germany.
Competing interests
The authors declare they have no competing interests.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Author details
1Department of Health Systems Governance and Financing, World Health
Organization, Avenue Appia, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland. 2Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 36,
53113 Bonn, Germany.Received: 10 August 2016 Accepted: 11 January 2017
References
1. Bitran R. Universal Health Coverage and the Challenge of Informal
Employment: Lessons from Developing Countries [Health, Nutrition, and
Population (HNP) Discussion Paper]. Washington DC: World Bank Group;
2014. [cited 2014 Dec 28]. Available from: URL:http://documents.worldbank.
org/curated/en/2014/01/19491214/universal-health-coverage-challenge-
informal-employment-lessons-developing-countries.
2. Kutzin J, Shishkin S, Brydnova L, Schneider P, Hrobon P. Reforms in the pooling
of funds. In: Kutzin J, Cashin C, Jakab M, editors. Implementing health financing
reform: Lessons from countries in transition, vol. 21. Brussels: European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies; 2010. p. 119–54.
3. Carrin G, James C. Social Health Insurance: Key Factors Affecting the
Transition Towards Universal Coverage. Int Soc Secur Rev. 2005;58(1):45–64.
4. Savedoff WD. Is there a case for social insurance? Health Policy Plan.
2004;19(3):183–4.
5. World Health Organization. The world health report - Health systems
financing: The path to universal coverage. 2010. [cited 2013 Jul 8]. Available
from: URL:http://www.who.int/whr/2010/en/index.html.
6. Pan American Health Organization. Strategy for Universal Access to Health
and Universal Health Coverage [53rd Directing Council, 66th Session of the
Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas, Washington D.C., USA. 2014.
[cited 2014 Dec 28]. Available from: URL:http://www.paho.org/hq/index.
php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=27312&Itemid=
270&lang=fr.
7. Dmytraczenko T, Almeida G, editors. Toward Universal Health Coverage and
Equity in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Selected
Countries: The World Bank; 2015.
8. Meng Q, Yuan B, Jia L, Wang J, Yu B, Gao J, et al. Expanding health
insurance coverage in vulnerable groups: a systematic review of options.
Health Policy Plan. 2011;26(2):93–104.
9. Atun R, de Andrade, Luiz Odorico Monteiro, Almeida G, Cotlear D,
Dmytraczenko T, Frenz P, Garcia P, Gómez-Dantés O, Knaul FM, Muntaner C,
de Paula, Juliana Braga, Rígoli F, Serrate PC, Wagstaff A. Health-System
Reform and Universal Health Coverage in Latin America [Universal Health
Coverage in Latin America 1]: The Lancet; 2014 [cited 2014 Dec 28].
Available from: URL:http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/
PIIS0140-6736%2814%2961646-9/abstract.
10. Titelman D, Cetrángolo O, Acosta OL. Universal Health Coverage in Latin
American Countries: How to Improve Solidarity-based Schemes. The Lancet 2014.
11. Vilcu I, Mathauer I. State budget transfers to health insurance funds for
universal health coverage: Institutional design patterns and challenges of
covering those outside the formal sector in Eastern European high-income
countries. International Journal for Equity in Health 2016; 15(7).
12. Mathauer I, Theisling M, Mathivet B, Vilcu I. State budget transfers to health
insurance funds: extending universal health coverage in low- and middle-
income countries of the WHO European Region: Institutional design
patterns and challenges in low-and middle-income countries of the WHO
European Region. Int J Equity Health. 2016;15(1):57.
13. Vilcu I, Probst L, Bayarsaikhan D, Mathauer I. Subsidized Health Insurance
Coverage of People in the Informal Sector and Vulnerable Population
Groups: Institutional Design Trends in Asia. Int J Equity Health. 2016;15:165.
14. Mathauer I, et al. Budget transfers to health insurance: Design features and
challenges in Africa [HGF Draft Discussion Paper]: World Health Organization. 2016.
15. World Health Organization. Global Health Expenditure Database: Table of
key indicators for all the Member States. 2016. Available from: URL:http://apps.
who.int/nha/database/Select/Indicators/en.
16. Kutzin J. A descriptive framework for country-level analysis of health care
financing arrangements. Health Policy Plan. 2001;56(3):171–204.
17. Frenk J. Leading the Way towards Universal Health Coverage: A Call to
Action [Universal Health Coverage in Latin America 4]: The Lancet; 2014
[cited 2014 Dec 28]. Available from: URL:http://www.thelancet.com/journals/
lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2814%2961467-7/abstract.
18. The World Bank. New Country Classifications; 2013 [cited 2014 Jun 8].
Available from: URL:http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-country-classifications.
19. Gwatkin D. Are Free Government Health Services The Best Way to Reach
the Poor?: The World Bank; 2004 [cited 2014 Jun 7]. Available from: URL:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/
Resources/281627-1095698140167/Chapter2Final.pdf.
Mathauer and Behrendt BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:145 Page 23 of 2520. Bonilla-Chacín ME, Aguilera N. The Mexican Social Protection System in
Health [Universal Health Coverage Studies Series (UNICO) No. 14]: The
World Bank; 2013 [cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Images/MexicanSocial
ProtectionSysteminHealth.pdf.
21. Montenegro-Torres F, Acevedo OB. Colombia Case Study: The Subsidized
Regime of Colombia's National Health Insurance System [Universal Health
Coverage Studies Series (UNICO) No. 15]: The World Bank; 2013 [cited 2014
Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/
publication/universal-health-coverage-study-series.
22. Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage. Mexico: Seguro
Popular; 2014 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:http://programs.
jointlearningnetwork.org/content/seguro-popular.
23. Alcalde-Rabanal JE, Lazo-González O, Nigenda G. Sistema de salud de Perú.
Salud Publica Mex. 2011;53(2):S243–54.
24. Torrenegra-Cabrera EC. The Subsidized Health-care Scheme in the Social Protection
System. In: International Labour Organization, editor. United Nations Development
Programme. New York: Sharing Innovative Experiences; 2011. p. 209–38.
25. Vargas I, Vázquez ML, Mogollón-Pérez AS, Unger J. Barriers of access to care
in a managed competition model: lessons from Colombia. BMC Health Serv
Res. 2010;10(1):297.
26. Giovanella L, Ruiz G, Feo O, Tobar S, Faria M. Health Systems in South America
- Introduction. In: Instituto Suramericano de Gobierno de Salud (ISAGS) - Unión
de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), editor. Health Systems in South
America: Challenges to the Universality, Integrality and Equity. p. 22–69.
27. Bossert T, Blanchet N, Sheetz S, Pinto D, Cali J, Cuevas RP. Comparative
Review of Health System Integration in Selected Countries in Latin America:
Inter-American Development Bank, Social Protection and Health Division;
2014 [cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://idbdocs.iadb.org/
wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=38336354.
28. Cotlear D, Gómez-Dantés O, Knaul F, Atun R, Barreto, Ivana C H C,
Cetrángolo O, Cueto M, Francke P, Frenz P, Guerrero R, Lozano R, Marten R,
Sáenz R. Overcoming Social Segregation in Health Care in Latin America
[Universal Health Coverage in Latin America 2]: The Lancet; 2014 [cited 2014
Dec 30]. Available from: URL:http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/
article/PIIS0140-6736%2814%2961647-0/abstract.
29. Iunes R, Cubillos-Turriago L, Escobar M. Universal Health Coverage and
Litigation in Latin America [A regular series of notes highlighting recent
lessons emerging from the operational and analytical, Number 178 (July
2012)]: The World Bank; 2012 [cited 2014 Jun 8]. Available from: URL:https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13072.
30. Francke P. Peru's Comprehensive Health Insurance and New Challenges for
Universal Coverage [Universal Health Coverage Studies Series (UNICO) No.
11]: The World Bank; 2013 [cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://
www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/publication/universal-health-coverage-
study-series.
31. Superintendencia de Salud Chile. Modalidad Libre Elección o M.L.E.; 2017 [cited
2017 Jan 17]. Available from: URL:http://www.supersalud.gob.cl/difusion/665/
w3-propertyvalue-2383.html.
32. Rathe M. Dominican Republic: Can universal coverage be achieved? [World
Health Report 2010, Background Paper 10]: World Health Organization; 2010
[cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:http://www.who.int/healthsystems/
topics/financing/healthreport/DR_No10.pdf.
33. Class D, Cavagnero E, Rajkumar AS. Health Financing Profile - Peru: Ministry
of Health, Peru; The World Bank; 2013 [cited 2014 May 3]. Available from:
URL:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/242851468099278957/
Peru-Health-financing-profile.
34. Seinfeld J, Montañez V, Besich N. The Health Insurance System in Peru:
Towards a Universal Health Insurance: Global Development Network; 2013
[cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://www.gdn.int/admin/uploads/
editor/files/GDN_PEMRP_CIUP_PS_Health.pdf.
35. Núñez J, Zapata JG, Castañeda C, Fonseca M, Ramírez J. La Sostenibilidad
Financiera del Sistema de Salud de Colombia: Dinámico del gasto y principales
retos de cara al futuro: Fedesarollo; 2012 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:
http://www.fedesarrollo.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/La-sostenibilidad-
financiera-del-Sistema-de-Salud-Colombiano-Libro-Sura-Final-20121.pdf.
36. Knaul FM, González-Pier E, Gómez-Dantés O, García-Junco D, Arreola-
Ornelas H, Barraza-Lloréns M, et al. The quest for universal health coverage:
achieving social protection for all in Mexico. Lancet. 2012;380(9849):1259–79.
37. Lakin J. Mexico's Health System: More Comprehensive Reform Needed.
PLoS Med. 2009;6(8):e1000130.38. Scott J. Seguro Popular Incidence Analysis: Centro de Investigación y
Docencia Económicas; 2006 [cited 2014 May 4]. Available from: URL:http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMEXICOINSPANISH/Resources/VolIIChapter3.pdf.
39. Xu K. Designing Health Financing Systems to Reduce Catastrophic Health
Expenditure [Technical Brief for Policy-Makers]: World Health Organization;
2005 [cited 2014 Jun 8]. Available from: URL:http://www.who.int/health_
financing/documents/dp_e_05_2-distribution_of_health_payments.pdf.
40. World Health Organization. Distribution of health payments and
catastrophic expenditures: Methodology [Discussion Paper 2]; 2005 [cited
2014 Jun 8]. Available from: URL:http://www.who.int/health_financing/
documents/dp_e_05_2-distribution_of_health_payments.pdf.
41. Evans D, Hsu J, Boerma T. Universal health coverage and universal access.
Bull World Health Organ. 2013;91:546–546A.
42. Dannreuther C, Gideon J. Entitled to Health? Social Protection in Chile's Plan
AUGE. Dev Chang. 2008;39(5):845–64.
43. Valdivia M. Etnicidad como determinante de la inequidad en salud
materno-infantil en el Perú. In: Hernández Bello A, Rico de Sotelo C, editors.
Protección social en salud en América Latina y el Caribe: Investigación y
políticas. Ottawa [Ont.], Bogatá [Columbia]: Centro Internacional de
Investigaciones para Dessarrollo/International Development Research
Centre; Pontificia Universidad Javeriana; 2011. p. 121–58.
44. Hernández Bello A, Vega Romero R, Gutiérrez Bonilla ML. Retos para una
protección social integral: vulerabilidad y exclusión de la población desplazada
en Colombia. In: Hernández Bello A, Rico de Sotelo C, editors. Protección social
en salud en América Latina y el Caribe: Investigación y políticas. Ottawa [Ont.],
Bogatá [Columbia]: Centro Internacional de Investigaciones para Dessarrollo/
International Development Research Centre; Pontificia Universidad Javeriana;
2011. p. 235–88.
45. Saldarriaga ÁC, Nieto López E, Mejía Ortega LM. Factores relacionados con
el no aseguramiento en salud de los trabajadores cesantes en la ciudad de
Medellín, Colombia, 2007. In: Hernández Bello A, Rico de Sotelo C, editors.
Protección social en salud en América Latina y el Caribe: Investigación y
políticas. Ottawa [Ont.], Bogatá [Columbia]: Centro Internacional de
Investigaciones para Dessarrollo/International Development Research
Centre; Pontificia Universidad Javeriana; 2011. p. 289–318.
46. Montenegro-Torres F. Costa Rica Case Study: Primary Health Care
Achievements and Challenges within the framework of the Social Health




47. Missoni E, Solimano G. Towards Universal Health Coverage: the Chilean
experience [World Health Report 2010, Background Paper 4]: World Health
Organization; 2010 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:http://
digicollection.org/hss/documents/s18282en/s18282en.pdf.
48. Vega J, Frenz P. Latin America: Priorities for Universal Health Coverage
[Comment]: The Lancet; 2014 [cited 2014 Dec 31]. Available from: URL:
http://www.thelancet.com/series/latin-america-UHC.
49. Zúñiga-Brenes MP, Vargas JR, Vindas A. Out-of-pocket and Catastrophic
Health Expenditures Puzzle: The Costa Rican experience [Financiamiento en
Salud y Protección Social en América Latina y el Caribe]: International
Development Centre (Ottawa, Canada); Fundación Mexicana para la Salud;
2010 [cited 2014 Apr 6]. Available from: URL:http://www.funsalud.org.mx/
competitividad/financiamiento/Documentos/Working%20paper%20uno/
Costa%20Rica%20WP1.pdf.
50. The World Bank. GDP per capita (current US$); 2014 [cited 2014 Feb 8].
Available from: URL:http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
51. United Nations Statistics Division. Social Indicators: United Nations; 2014
[cited 2014 Jun 8]. Available from: URL:http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/products/socind/default.htm.
52. Fundación Milenio. Informe Nacional de Coyuntura: SUMI [27 of June of
2014]; 2014 [cited 2014 Dec 30]. Available from: URL:http://www.fundacion-
milenio.org/Informe-Nacional-de-Coyuntura/coy-242-sumi.html.
53. Ministerio de Salud del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Ley No. 475: Prestaciones
de Servicios de Salud Integral del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia [Presentation of
the Ministry of Health of the Plurinational State of Bolivia]; 2014.
54. Presidente Constitucional del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Decreto
Supremo N° 1984: Reglamento a la Ley N° 475 de Prestaciones de Servicios
de Salud Integral del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia; 2014 [cited 2014 Dec
30]. Available from: URL:http://www.sobretodopersonas.org/
phocadownload/normasnac/DECRETO%20SUPREMO%201984.pdf.
Mathauer and Behrendt BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:145 Page 24 of 2555. Fondo Nacional de la Salud Chile. Asegurados. Carentes de Recursos Tramo
A; 2016 [cited 2016 Jan 20]. Available from: URL:https://fonasaweb.fonasa.cl/
portal_fonasa/site/artic/20140621/pags/20140621214701.html.
56. Superintendencia de Salud Chile. ¿Cómo se clasifican los beneficiarios
de Fonasa según su tramo?; 2014 [cited 2014 Feb 8]. Available from:
URL:http://www.supersalud.gob.cl/consultas/570/w3-article-6304.html.
57. Fondo Nacional de la Salud Chile. Asegurados. Carentes de Recursos Tramo
A; 2016 [cited 2016 Jan 20]. Available from: URL:https://fonasaweb.fonasa.cl/
portal_fonasa/site/artic/20140621/pags/20140621214701.html.
58. Guerrero R, Gallego AI, Becerril-Montekio V, Vásquez J. Sistema de salud de
Colombia. Salud Publica Mex. 2011;53(2):S144–55.
59. Secretería General de la Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C. Acuerdo 415 de
2009 Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud; 2009 [cited 2014 Feb
25]. Available from: URL:http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/
Norma1.jsp?i=37351.
60. Ministerio de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones.
Inscripción al régimen subsidiado de salud [Alcaldía de Florida]; 2014 [cited
2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:https://www.gobiernoenlinea.gov.co/web/
guest/home%3Bjsessionid = 611F9D69F5E0B5C530AC1CFD20818707?p_p_id
= GovBuilderPdfServicesViewer_WAR_govservicesviewerportlet&p_p_lifecycle
= 0&p_p_state = exclusive&p_p_mode = view&_GovBuilderPdfServicesViewer_
WAR_govservicesviewerportlet_serviceId = 13112.
61. Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social. Reglamento del Régimen
Subsidiado del Sistema Dominicana de Seguridad Social; 2003 [cited
2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://www.tss.gov.do/pdf/regla_
regimen_sub.pdf.
62. Sistema Unico de Beneficiarios. Qué es el SIUBEN? [Gobierno Dominicano];
2014 [cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://www.siuben.gob.do/la-
instituci%C3%B3n/%C2%BFqu%C3%A9-es-el-siuben.aspx.
63. Rathe M, Moliné A. Sistema de salud de República Dominicana. Salud
Publica Mex. 2011;53(2):S255–64.
64. Seguro Popular. Regimenes Estatales: Comissión Nacional de Protección
Social en Salud; 2012 [cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://www.
seguro-popular.salud.gob.mx/index.php?option = com_content&view =
article&id = 41&Itemid = 8.
65. Superintendencia Nacional de Aseguramiento en Salud. La Ley Marco de
Aseguramiento Universal en Salud: Ley N° 29344; 2014 [cited 2014 Feb 25].
Available from: URL:http://app3.sunasa.gob.pe/Temp/Ley_29344._
Aseguramiento_Universal_en_Salud.pdf.
66. Ministerio de Desarollo e Inclusión Social. Sistema de Focalización de
Hogares [cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://www.mef.gob.pe/
contenidos/presu_publ/capacita/1_present_ULF.pdf.
67. Asamblea General. Ley N° 18.596; 2009 [cited 2014 Jun 8]. Available from:
URL:http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/AnexoXXIII_Ley18596.pdf.
68. Aran D, Laca H. Sistema de salud de Uruguay. Salud Publica Mex. 2013;53(2):
S265–74.
69. Administración de los Servicios de Salud del Estado. Afiliación Gratuita; 2014
[cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://www.asse.com.uy/uc_6418_1.html.
70. Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional. Bolivia: Ley N° 475, 30 de diciembre de
2013 [Ley de prestaciones servicios de salud integral del Estado
Plurinacional de Bolivia]; 2013 [cited 2014 Jun 8]. Available from: URL:http://
www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-N475.xhtml.
71. Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage. Chile: National
Health Fund (FONASA); 2014 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:http://
www.jointlearningnetwork.org/content/national-health-fund-fonasa.
72. World Health Organization. Success Stories of Health Financing Reforms for
Universal Health Coverage: Chile; 2012 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from:
URL:http://www.who.int/providingforhealth/PH4_Chile_2.pdf.
73. Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. Sistema General de Participaciones SGP; 2014
[cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:http://impuestos.shd.gov.co/portal/
page/portal/portal_internet_sdh/tesoreria/ingresos_tes/SGP.
74. Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social. Unidad de Pago por Capitación
[República de Colombia]; 2014 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:
http://www.minsalud.gov.co/salud/POS/Paginas/Proyecto-POS-UPC.aspx.
75. Rocío-Sáenz Md, Bermúdez JL, Acosta M. Universal Health Coverage in a Middle
Income Country: Costa Rica [World Health Report, Background Paper, 11]: World
Health Organization; 2010 [cited 2014 Feb 25]. Available from: URL:http://www.
who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/CostaRicaNo11.pdf.
76. Durán Valverde F. Innovaciones en la extensión de la cobertura del seguro
social a los trabajadores independientes: Experiencias de Brazil, Cabo Verde,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Filipinas, Francia y Uruguay: InternationalLabour Organization; 2013 [cited 2015 Jan 5]. Available from: URL:http://
labordoc.ilo.org/record/459874.
77. Tuluy HA, Brook PJ, Hansen KE, Godinho J, Gragnolati M, Perez LO. Republic
of Uruguay: Integrated National Health System; Analysis of the Governability




78. Aguilar Rivera, Ana Mylena, Xu K, Carrin G. The Bolivian Health System and
its Impact on Health Care Use and Financial Risk Protection: World Health
Organization; 2006 [cited 2014 Dec 30]. Available from: URL:http://www.
who.int/health_financing/Bolivian_health_system.pdf.
79. Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage. Colombia: General
System of Social Security in Health; 2014 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from:
URL:http://www.jointlearningnetwork.org/content/general-system-social-
security-health.
80. Vargas-Zea N, Castro H, Rodríguez-Páez F, Téllez D, Salazar-Arias R.
Colombian Health System on its Way to Improve Allocation Efficiency -
Transition from a Health Sector Reform to the Settlement of an HTA
Agency. Value Health Reg Issues. 2012;1(2):218–22.
81. Rathe M, Knaul F, Yerramilli P. Financing Cancer Care and Control in
Dominican Republic [DCP3 Volume 6, Chapter 15 Supplement]: Harvard Global
Equity Initiative; 2014 [cited 2016 Jul 14]. Available from: URL:hgei.harvard.edu/
fs/docs/icb.topic910623.files/DCP3 Input -Dominican Republic.pdf.
82. Superintendencia de Salud Chile. Patologías garantizadas AUGE; 2016 [cited
2016 Aug 4]. Available from: URL:http://www.supersalud.gob.cl/difusion/572/
w3-propertyname-501.html.
83. Ministerio de Salud de Colombia. ABC de la Unificación del POS; 2012 [cited
2014 Dec 31]. Available from: URL:http://www.minsalud.gov.co/Paginas/
ABC%20de%20la%20Unificaci%C3%B3n%20del%20POS.aspx.
84. Cooperativa Empresa Solidaria de Salud y Desarrollo Integral (COOSALUD
EPS-S). Régimen de Copagos; 2014 [cited 2014 Apr 3]. Available from: URL:
http://www.coosalud.com/index.php/afiliados/coopago/.
85. Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social. Decreto Número 1683 de 2013;
2013 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:http://www.consultorsalud.
com/attachments/article/0/Decreto%201683%20de%202013%20-%20
portabilidad%20nacional%20de%20salud.pdf.
86. Centro de Desarrollo Estratégico e Información en Salud y Seguridad Social
(CENDEISSS). Reglamento del seguro de salud; 2014 [cited 2014 Mar 3].
Available from: URL:http://www.cendeisss.sa.cr/etica/reglamentosalud.pdf.
87. Rodríguez I. Ebais y clínicas mejorarán sus procesos para atender infartos: La
Nación; 2013 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:http://www.nacion.
com/vivir/medicina/Ebais-clinicas-mejoraran-procesos-infartos_0_
1369063156.html.
88. Di McIntyre. Country Case Study: Universal Health Insurance in Costa Rica:
University of Cape Town, Health Economics Unit; 2006 [cited 2014 Mar 3].
Available from: URL:http://uct-heu.s3.amazonaws.com/10FinancingCostaRica.pdf.
89. Presidente de la República Dominicana. Decreto Número 74–03:
Reglamento sobre el Seguro Familiar y el Plan Básico de la Salud; 2003




90. Laurell, Asa Cristina. Impacto del seguro popular en el sistema de salud
mexicano. Buenos Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
(CLACSO); 2013.
91. Gobierno del Distrito Federal. Portabilidad 32 x 32: Sistema de Protección
Social en Salud, Seguro Popular; 2014 [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from:
URL:http://www.salud.df.gob.mx/ssdf/seguro_popular/index/portabilidad.php.
92. Sollazzo A, Berterretche R. El Sistema Nacional Integrado de Salud en
Uruguay y los desafíos para la Atención Primaria; 2011 [cited 2014 May 3].
Available from: URL:http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id = 63019110021.
93. Mathauer I, Wittenbecher F. Hospital payment systems based on diagnosis-
related groups: experiences in low- and middle-income countries. Bulletin
of the World Health Organization 2013 [cited 2013 Apr 4]; (91):746-756A.
Available from: URL:http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/91/10/12-115931/en/.
94. Instituto Suramericano de Gobierno de Salud (ISAGS) - Unión de Naciones
Suramericanas (UNASUR), editor. Health Systems in South America:
Challenges to the Universality, Integrality and Equity. Available from: URL:
http://www.isags-unasur.org/uploads/biblioteca/2/bb%5B8%5Dling%5B3%5
Danx%5B8%5D.pdf.
Mathauer and Behrendt BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:145 Page 25 of 2595. Fondo Nacional de la Salud Chile. Estadísticas Institucionales [Boletin
Estadístico 2011–2012]; 2014 [cited 2014 Apr 8]. Available from: URL:
http://www.fonasa.cl/wps/wcm/connect/Internet/SA-General/Informacion
+ Corporativa/Estadisticas + Institucionales/.
96. Pérez J. Una mirada al Seguro Familiar de Salud: Observatorio Político
Dominicano; 2013 [cited 2014 Jun 10]. Available from: URL:http://www.opd.
org.do/index.php?view = article&catid = 112%3Aanalisis-pp&id = 1279%3
Auna-mirada-al-seguro-familiar-de-salud&tmpl = component&print = 1&
layout = default&page = &option = com_content.
97. Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social. La Seguridad Social Avanza en
República Dominicana. Informa - Organo Informativo del Consejo Nacional
de Seguridad Social; 2016(24).
98. Xu K, Saksena P, Jowett M, Indikadahena C, Kutzin J, Evans D. Exploring the
thresholds of health expenditure for protection against financial risk [World
Health Report 2010, Background Paper 19]: World Health Organization; 2010
[cited 2015 Jan 5]. Available from: URL:www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/
financing/healthreport/19THE-thresv2.pdf.
99. Knaul FM, Wong R, Arreola-Ornelas H, editors. Financing Health in Latin
America: Household Spending and Impoverishment: Harvard University
Press; 2012. (Volume 1) [cited 2014 Mar 3]. Available from: URL:http://www.
idrc.ca/EN/Documents/Financing-Health-in-Latin-America-Volume-1.pdf.
100. Wagstaff A, Cotlear D, Hoang-Vu Eozenou P, Buisman LR. Measuring
Progress Towards Universal Health Coverage: With An Application to 24
Developing Countries [Policy Research Working Paper 7470]: World Bank
Group; 2015 [cited 2016 Jul 14]. Available from: URL:documents.worldbank.
org/curated/en/2015/11/25239709/measuring-progress-towards-universal-
health-coverage-application-24-developing-countries.•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
